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households anticipating higher future addictive tax rates reduce current addictive 
consumption, so they will be less addicted when the tax rate increases. Therefore, 
addictive tax revenue falls prior to the tax increase. Surprisingly, the optimal tax 
rate on addictive goods is generally decreasing in the strength of tolerance, since 
strong tolerance strengthens this tax anticipation effect. Second, high current tax 
rates on addictive goods make households less addicted in the future, affecting 
all future tax revenues in a way which depends on how elasticities are chang-
ing over time. Classic results on uniform commodity taxation emerge as special 
cases when elasticities are constant and the addiction function is homogeneous 
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“People should understand: Those who drink, those who smoke are doing more to help the 
state… If you smoke a pack of cigarettes, that means you are giving more to help solve social 
problems such as boosting demographics, developing other social services and upholding 
birth rates.”
Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin on September 2, 2010 announcing the 
Russian government’s plan to raise excise duties on alcohol and cigarettes.
1  Introduction
A popular and increasingly common way for local, state, and federal govern-
ments to raise revenue is through taxation of addictive goods, including ciga-
rettes, alcohol, and gambling. According to the Tax Policy Center, in 2008 the US 
cumulative state and local alcohol, tobacco and lottery tax revenues exceeded 
43 billion dollars. What is the optimal excise tax for addictive goods, when the 
government must raise revenue to finance a stream of exogenous government 
expenditures? The goal of this paper is to characterize and analyze the condi-
tions under which taxation of addictive goods might differ from taxes on labor 
and non-addictive consumption goods (hereafter ordinary goods) in a dynamic 
general equilibrium setting.
This paper extends classic results of optimal commodity taxation (e.g., 
 Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972) to the case of addictive goods and obtains a rich set 
of new dynamic findings not found in typical models which are either static or 
assume very specific utility functions or both. For common cases such as homo-
thetic and separable utility, we show that the classic results obtained in the litera-
ture on optimal taxation of ordinary goods do not necessarily extend to addictive 
goods, when addiction is modeled as a rational dynamic process as in Becker and 
Murphy (1988), hereafter BM.
Two dynamic effects emerge. Both stem from the tolerance property of addic-
tive goods: past consumption decreases current utility by raising the amount of 
consumption needed to sustain the addiction (BM). The first effect we label the 
tax anticipation effect. To gain insight, consider an announced increase in the 
addictive goods excise tax. Households anticipate, prior to the tax increase, that 
higher addictive taxes will reduce future addictive consumption. This provides 
an incentive to reduce addictive consumption in the period prior to the increase 
in taxes, since doing so makes the household less addicted when the tax increase 
occurs. This reduces addictive tax revenue in the period prior to the increase in 
addictive taxes and therefore moderates the total revenue raised over time.
We show that, under the mild assumption of homogeneity of the function 
which maps addictive consumption into consumption in excess of that required 
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to sustain addiction (hereafter effective consumption), the tax anticipation effect 
is equivalent to a single current period revenue effect. In particular, the dynamic 
tax anticipation effect makes a tax on addictive goods equivalent to a smaller tax 
on effective consumption. This allows us to evaluate the merits of taxing addic-
tive goods in familiar terms, such as the static complementarity between effective 
consumption and leisure.
A second effect arises since high current tax rates on addictive goods causes 
households to be less addicted in the future. Future effective consumption rises, 
affecting future addictive, ordinary, and labor tax revenues. We call this effect the 
addiction stock effect. Suppose for example that effective consumption is becom-
ing more complementary with leisure over time. Standard public finance theory 
(Corlett and Hague 1953) suggests that the tax rate on addictive goods should 
be relatively high, since reduced consumption of addictive goods will increase 
labor supply, thus raising labor income tax revenues. However, with tolerance, 
reduced current consumption of addictive goods raises future effective consump-
tion (households are less addicted in the future, and therefore get more effective 
consumption in the future from a given quantity of addictive goods). But then 
future labor supply falls, and future labor income tax revenues fall, offsetting 
some of the revenue gains in the current period. Whether total tax revenues rise 
or fall depends on how elasticities are changing over time. For example, if the 
complementarity of addictive consumption with leisure is decreasing over time, 
labor tax revenues are less sensitive to changes in current addictive consump-
tion than to changes in future addictive consumption. Taxing addictive goods 
becomes less attractive over time. Optimal addictive taxation should smooth dis-
tortions: taxing addictive goods today may make taxing addictive goods more or 
less distortionary in the future depending, for example, on their relationship with 
leisure.
The addiction stock effect smoothes intertemporal distortions caused by taxa-
tion for revenue raising. In this sense, our results are related to those on capital 
taxation (Chamley 1986; Chari and Kehoe 1998). A disadvantage of capital taxation 
is that it reduces the future capital stock and thus the future tax base. Similarly, 
taxation of addictive goods reduces the future stock of addiction, and through the 
elasticity, the future tax base. Nonetheless, our results are novel because addictive 
consumption acts like both a final good (current addictive consumption) and as 
an intermediate good (current addictive consumption affects future addictive con-
sumption). For instance, optimal steady state tax rates on addictive goods equal 
tax rates on ordinary consumption in some cases where optimal capital tax rates 
are zero, because addictive consumption acts like a final good.
Uniform taxation of addictive and ordinary goods emerges as a special 
cases when elasticities are constant and the effective consumption function is 
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homogeneous of degree one. Constant elasticities ensure no distortion smoothing 
motivation exists, whereas homogeneity of degree one causes the tax anticipa-
tion effect to exactly offset standard static revenue effects.
The literature typically models effective consumption in one of two ways: the 
subtractive specification (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999; Chugh 2007) and the 
multiplicative specification (e.g., Abel 1990). These two models differ in terms of 
their homogeneity properties.1 In this paper, we show that the optimal tax policy 
depends crucially on the degree of homogeneity of the addiction function.
In particular, we show that, given separable or homothetic utility with con-
stant relative risk aversion, raising the degree of homogeneity makes addictive 
consumption more income inelastic in the equivalent static model without addic-
tion. Thus, taxation of addictive goods is more attractive if the addiction model is 
homogeneous of degree one, as in the subtractive case, than if the addiction model 
is homogeneous of degree less than one, as in the multiplicative case, since it is 
optimal to tax necessities at a higher rate. Further, strong tolerance in the multipli-
cative model decreases the degree of homogeneity, making addictive goods more 
income elastic, which therefore lowers the optimal tax rate on addictive goods.
To compute optimal tax rates, we use the primal approach to Ramsey taxa-
tion. A large literature exists using the primal approach. Chari and Kehoe (1998) 
and Erosa and Gervais (2001) derive many results with both finitely and infinitely 
lived agents. More recent examples include Kyung (2009), Armenter (2008), 
Chugh (2007), Cunha (2008), Erosa and Gervais (2002), and Sleet and Yeltekin 
(2006). Chugh (2007) in particular undertakes a quantitative study of optimal 
inflation rates in a model where consumption goods are habit forming. The 
primal approach does restrict taxes to be linear, but this is not restrictive for the 
case of taxes on addictive goods.2
In the next section we describe the main alternative motives for taxing addic-
tive goods found in the literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we develop a dynamic, 
rational addiction model with optimal taxation. Section 5 identifies the addic-
tion stock and tax anticipation effects and determines conditions under which 
1 A good is habit forming if the marginal utility of the good is increasing in past consumption. 
We use the standard definition of addiction, which is when current consumption is increasing 
in past consumption, holding fixed the marginal utility of wealth and prices. Habit formation is 
often used in the macro literature, whereas addiction was introduced by BM. It is straightforward 
to show that the subtractive model of habit formation implies the good is addictive, and the mul-
tiplicative model of habit formation implies the good is addictive with an additional restriction.
2 If households are heterogeneous, high addictive consumption may signal high stock of addic-
tion, and therefore inelastic demand, which may imply higher optimal tax rates. While allowing 
for nonlinear taxes is possible using the Mirrless approach (Kocherlakota 2005), we chose not to 
adopt that framework for three reasons. First, nonlinear taxation of addictive goods is unlikely to 
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optimal tax rates for addictive goods exceed tax rates for ordinary consumption 
goods. Section 6 gives results for the homothetic class of preferences. The appen-
dix contains the proofs of all the propositions and extends the analysis to three 
other preferences classes.
2  Taxing addiction
Three main motivations exist in the literature for taxing addictive goods differ-
ently than ordinary goods. The first is to lower the external costs often associated 
with consumption of addictive goods. The second is because some households 
fail to take into account some private costs and thus over-consume. The motiva-
tion which is the focus of this paper is to raise revenue.
2.1  Addictive goods and fiscal concerns
Taxation of many addictive goods, such as lotteries, has an obvious revenue 
raising component. Taxes on many other addictive goods are dictated by fiscal 
concerns. For example, the repeal of alcohol Prohibition in the 1930s was clearly 
approved for tax revenue considerations as the onset of the Great Depression neg-
atively impacted all other government revenues (Boudreaux and Pritchard 1994). 
Parry, Laxminarayan, and West (2009) also note that the last two increases in 
federal alcohol taxes were part of deficit reduction packages.3
be feasible in practice. Households can evade nonlinear taxes by buying addictive goods in small 
quantities or over the Internet (Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod 2009), or by bootlegging 
across states, and the government cannot easily aggregate all addictive goods purchases made 
by the household. Second, the majority of addictive taxes in the US are administered locally and 
states and municipalities tax addictive goods mostly because they are concerned with raising 
revenue (see the next paragraph for evidence) rather than optimal redistribution. Indeed, the 
vast majority of redistribution efforts are carried out at the federal level, since tax competition 
across states limits the ability of state’s to maintain discriminatory tax rates and since incomes 
within states and municipalities are more homogeneous than across the US. Lastly, in practice 
(probably because of the first two reasons), in the US tax system we see almost exclusively linear 
excise taxes.
3 For lotteries, external costs are presumably small, but the nationwide average lottery tax rang-
es from 40% in 1989 (Clotfelter and Cook 1990) to 31% in 2003 (Hansen 2004), accounting for 2% 
of state tax revenues. States spent about $272 million on lottery advertising in 1989, which is at 
least a strong indication that states are motivated by revenue concerns, rather than the external 
costs of lotteries and other forms of gambling. In September 2013, there were proposals to use 
higher cigarette taxes to close budget deficits in Florida, Illinois, West Virginia, and elsewhere.
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In November 2010 in California a ballot measure that would have allowed 
local government to legally sell marijuana was put to vote and rejected with 54% 
of the voters against it. The “Regulate, Control and Tax Cannabis Act” would 
have permitted local governments to impose and collect cannabis-related fees 
and taxes similarly to what is done with alcohol. The revenue potential of taxing 
marijuana was the major argument in favor of this ballot measure. In an interest-
ing and thought provoking paper, Miron (2010) analyzes the budgetary implica-
tions of legalizing drugs. He finds that the savings in government expenditure 
and the gains in tax revenue (at the federal and local level) that would result from 
replacing drug prohibition with a regime in which drugs are legal, and taxed like 
alcohol and tobacco to be $83 billion per year.
Since the poor presumably spend a higher fraction of income on addictive 
goods, taxing addictive goods for revenue raising must be justified on efficiency 
grounds, rather than redistribution. A few papers consider the efficient revenue 
raising motivation by treating addictive goods in a static way as simply goods with 
external costs, which are possibly complementary with leisure. If so, one can apply 
the ideas from the “double dividend” literature (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 1996). 
Taxing a good with external costs raises revenues which can be used to reduce taxes 
on labor income (the “revenue recycling effect”). If taxing addictive goods results 
in lower dead-weight losses than taxing labor, then the revenue recycling effect is 
positive and it is optimal to tax addictive goods at a relatively high rate. Moreover, 
a good with external costs may also be taxed above its Pigouvian rate for revenue 
raising if it is complementary with leisure, since the tax increases labor supply and 
labor income tax revenues (the “tax interaction effect”).4
However, this literature models addiction in a static way as simply a good 
with external costs; the dynamic nature of addiction is ignored. It remains unclear 
how dynamic addictive properties such as tolerance affect optimal revenue 
raising. This paper fills this gap in the literature by considering a dynamic model 
of rational addiction while explicitly considering a revenue raising motive. We 
model addiction using BM’s rational addiction framework. In this approach, 
addictive consumption is linked to past consumption, but the first welfare 
theorem holds. If no externalities exist, then the only rationale in the BM setting 
for taxing addictive goods is a revenue raising one. Unlike static models, in our 
dynamic framework changes in tax rates on addictive goods affects future rev-
enues, by altering future elasticities.
4 Sgontz (1993) finds the revenue recycling effect to be positive, and Parry, Laxminarayan, and 
West (2009) finds both the revenue recycling effect and the tax interaction effect to be positive: 
alcohol is complementary to leisure and also reduces labor productivity. Therefore, they find it 
is optimal to tax alcohol above its Pigouvian rate as part of the optimal revenue raising package.
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2.2  Addictive goods and externalities
The standard economic rationale for taxation of addictive goods is that their con-
sumption is often associated with external costs, such as second-hand smoke, 
drunk driving, and crime. The literature often finds addictive goods are taxed at 
a rate less than the rate which is second best in the sense that the government 
cannot discriminate between consumers who generate external costs and respon-
sible consumers.5
If we were to include a negative consumption externality for the addictive 
good in our model, then the results go through under slightly different condi-
tions. In particular, the conditions for which the optimal tax rate of an addictive 
good is above the rate which corrects the externality is similar to the conditions 
derived here for which the optimal tax rate of an addictive good is above the tax 
rate for ordinary consumption goods. Hence, our results can be simply inter-
preted as relative to the tax ratio which corrects the externality.
However, we decided not to include an externality in our problem for three 
reasons: first, it is well known (Pogue and Sgontz 1989; Kenkel 1996) that 
taxing an addictive good whose consumption is imperfectly correlated with 
an externality is a second-best solution. Taxing the actual behavior causing 
the externality (e.g., make the punishment for drunk driving more severe or 
banning smoking in public places) is more efficient. Indeed, Parry, Laxmi-
narayan, and West (2009) show that welfare gains from increasing drunk 
driving penalties exceed those from raising taxes on alcohol, even when 
implementation costs and dead-weight losses associated with incarceration 
are included. Second, as noted above the results are similar when an exter-
nality is included. Finally, our focus is on the effect of addiction on revenue 
raising, rather than externalities.
5 For example, Kenkel (1996) finds that a tax rate on alcohol of about 42% is optimal for the 
drunk driving externality, while the actual average tax rate ranges from over 50% in 1954 to 20% 
in the 1980s. Moreover, Grinols and Mustard (2006) estimate external costs of casino gambling 
are 47% of revenues, thus the optimal tax would be higher than 47% if demand for casino gam-
bling is inelastic, or  < 47% if a significant fraction of casino gamblers do not impose external 
costs. Anderson (2005) reports that casinos pay 16% of gross revenues in taxes. The empirical 
evidence is, however, mixed for cigarettes taxation: Manning et al. (1989) estimated the gross 
external cost of smoking in the US of approximately $0.43 per pack, but only $0.16 per pack 
once reductions in health care expenditures stemming from premature deaths were included. 
Viscusi (1995) finds that after accounting also for the lower nursing home cost and retirement 
pension savings the net external costs of smoking are negligible for the US Conversely, Gruber 
and Koszegi (2001) estimate external costs of smoking at $0.94 to $1.75 per pack, versus an aver-
age excise tax of about $0.65.
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2.3  Addictive goods and non-market internal costs
Another source of non-market costs occurs if addiction is modeled as non-fully 
rational excess consumption. Households may fail to take into account the self-
adverse health effects caused by consumption of addictive goods, either because 
they are unaware that addictive goods consumption has adverse health effects 
(e.g., Kenkel 1996) or because some households are exogenously assumed to 
be unable to take into account the health gains from reducing addictive goods 
consumption (e.g., Pogue and Sgontz 1989). Alternatively, households may 
mistakenly over consume relative to underlying preferences when exposed to 
environmental cues (Bernheim and Rangel 2004). When some households are 
exogenously assumed not to consider some private costs, they over-consume. The 
resulting “internality” causes the optimal second best (again, in the sense that 
the government cannot distinguish between naive and rational households) tax 
rate to rise considerably.6
A related, subsequent literature makes excess consumption endogenous and 
rational by modeling addictive goods with preferences that are time inconsist-
ent (Gruber and Koszegi 2001, 2004; O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003, 2006; Gul and 
Pesendorfer 2007). In this approach, consumers are rational, but over-consume 
in the sense that welfare increases with a government policy that reduces con-
sumption to a level which households would choose if they could pre-commit to 
consume less in the future. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) compute 
numerical examples where the optimal tax on unhealthy foods ranges from 1 to 
72%. Gruber and Koszegi (2001) show that the optimal tax on cigarettes rises to 
at least $1 per pack when the time inconsistency problem is included. However, 
Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) show that taxes decrease welfare whereas smoking 
bans and similar prohibitive policies increase welfare by serving as commitment 
devices.
Models with internalities match a number of empirical features of addiction, 
including rehab cycles, environmental cues, commitment devices, and kicking 
the habit. Empirical evidence also exists for the tax anticipation and addiction 
stock effect (see Section 4.2), features of the rational addiction model. For sim-
plicity, our focus is on the tax anticipation and addiction stock effects, and leave 
for future research the effect of other interesting features of addiction on revenue 
raising.
6 Kenkel (1996) finds the optimal tax rate on alcohol rises to about 106% while Pogue and Sgontz 
(1989) find the optimal tax rate on alcohol rises to 306%.
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3  Preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of measure 
one who maximize the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities. A representa-
tive household derives utility from consumption of an ordinary (non-addictive) 
good, ct, the fraction of time allocated to leisure, 1–ht≡lt∈[0, 1],7 and effective con-
sumption (i.e., consumption in excess of that required to sustain the addiction), 
st, of an addictive good, dt.
We model addiction using the rational addiction framework of Becker and 
Murphy (1988). In this approach, consumption of the addictive good is spe-
cifically related to past consumption. Evidence for rational addiction exists for 
cigarettes,8 alcohol,9 drugs (Grossman and Chaloupka 1998), food consumption 
(Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido 2005), carbonated drinks (Liu and Lopez 
2009), and caffeine (Olekalns and Bardsley 1996). These papers essentially test 
and find evidence for the tax anticipation effect, which is a testable implication 
of the rational addiction model. Dragone (2009) and Levy (2002) give a positive 
theory for the worldwide diffusion of obesity by proposing a rational addiction 
model for (junk) food intake behavior that is capable of displaying binges, diets 
and cycles for food consumption.
Let st = s(dt, dt–1) map addictive consumption into effective consumption.10 We 
assume throughout the paper that:
Assumption A1 Per-period utility, u(ct, st, lt), is strictly increasing, concave, and 
satisfies the Inada conditions in each argument.
Lifetime utility is:
 0
( , , );t t t t
t
U u c s lβ
∞
=
=∑
 
(3.1)
7 Endogenous labor supply allows the model to determine the effect of complementarities with 
leisure on taxation of addictive goods (see Section 8.6).
8 See for example, Arcidiacono, Sieg, and Sloan (2007), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Becker, 
Grossman, and Murphy (1994), Chaloupka (1991) and Sung, Hu, and Keeler (1994).
9 See for example, Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1998), Baltagi and Griffin (2002), 
Bentzen, Eriksson, and Smith (1999), Baltagi and Geishecker (2006), and Waters and Sloan 
(1995).
10 Here we follow the literature (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999) and assume s has only one 
lag. Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), who assume a utility function of the form u(ct, dt, 
dt–1), except they assume no preferences for leisure. Our assumption below that s is homogene-
ous is the main restriction we impose on their utility specification. However, our specification is 
considerably more general than the addiction literature which typically assumes one of the two 
special cases for s given below.
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where β is the discount factor with rate of time preference 1 .βρ
β
−
=
Let subscripts on functions denote corresponding partial derivatives. For 
effective consumption, we assume for the rest of the analysis that:
Assumption A2 s(dt, dt–1) is homogeneous of degree α in [dt, dt–1] (HD-α) and 
 satisfies i) s1 > 0, ii) s2 < 0, iii) s11 ≤  0, and iv) 
22
2
2
( , , )
( , , ) .
( , , )
ss t t t t
s t t t
s t t t
u c s l s s sc s l
u c s l s
σ
− ⋅
≡ ≥
Here σs is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for effective 
consumption. The first inequality states that households get positive marginal 
utility from consumption of the addictive good. The second inequality states that 
the addictive good has the tolerance property, meaning past consumption lowers 
current utility, which is also known a harmful addiction.11 The third and fourth 
inequalities are sufficient conditions which ensure that U is concave in the choice 
set [ct, lt, dt] if u is concave when st = dt (i.e., the standard problem with no addic-
tion is concave, see assumption 1). The role of homogeneity is discussed below.
11 Gruber and Koszegi (2004) and others define habit formation as past consumption increasing 
the taste for current consumption. Therefore, a good is habit forming if and only if: 
 
2
1
0.
t t
u
d d
−
∂
>∂ ∂
 (3.2)
 From the assumptions on s, a good is habit forming if and only if: 
  
12 1
1 1 2 1
( , )
( , , ) .
( , ) ( , )
t t t
s t t t
t t t t
s s d d
c s l
s d d s d d
σ −
− −
>
 
(3.3)
 BM and others define addiction as when past consumption increases current consumption, hold-
ing fixed prices and the marginal utility of ordinary consumption. Let ct = yt–ptdt, where yt repre-
sents income in period t and pt is the price of d in period t, then d is addictive if and only if: 
 
2
1
2
1
2
0,t t t
t
t
U
d d d
d U
d
−
−
∂
∂ ∂ ∂
= >∂ ∂
−
∂  
(3.4)
 holding fixed the marginal utility of consumption. Using the concavity assumptions, equation 
(3.4) simplifies to: 
 
2 2
1 1
0.
t t t t
U u
d d d d
− −
∂ ∂
= >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
(3.5)
 Thus d is addictive if and only if d is habit forming given the one-lag specification of effective 
consumption, and the concavity assumptions. In general, if s has more than one lag, addiction is 
more restrictive than habit formation. Thus, for example, habit formation and addiction are not 
equivalent in BM, but are equivalent in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994).
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The two most commonly used specifications of effective consumption, s, in 
the literature are the subtractive model (see, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999; 
Chugh 2007), where effective consumption is:
 1 ,t t ts d dγ −= −  (3.6)
and the multiplicative model (see, e.g., Abel 1990), which specifies effective 
 consumption as:
 1
.tt
t
ds
dγ
−
=
 
(3.7)
In both models γ ≥  0 denotes the strength of tolerance. If γ = 0, then past consump-
tion has no weight at all, in which case the model reduces to the standard time 
separable model, and utility is fully determined by consumption levels and not 
by the changes in consumption.
The subtractive specification satisfies assumption A2, and the multiplicative 
specification satisfies A2 for σs(ct, st, lt) > (1+γ)/γ∀t. However, two key differences 
exist. In the subtractive model, effective consumption is HD-1. In the multiplica-
tive model, effective consumption is HD-(1–γ), and the degree of homogeneity 
depends on the degree of tolerance. Moreover, equation (3.5) implies that if s is 
subtractive, then d is addictive for all γ > 0. However, if s is multiplicative, then d 
is addictive if and only if σs(ct, st, lt) > 1 for all [ct, st, lt].
4  Model
We consider an infinite horizon closed economy in discrete time. A large number 
of identical firms produce both addictive and ordinary goods using a constant 
return to scale technology. A government needs to finance a constant stream of 
government expenditures using an (second-best) optimal fiscal policy.
4.1  Firms
A large number of identical firms at time t rent capital kt and labor ht from house-
holds to produce a composite good using a technology F(kt, ht). We assume 
throughout the paper that:
Assumption A3 F(kt, ht) is constant returns to scale and increasing, concave, and 
satisfies Inada conditions in each input.
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Let wt denote the wage rate and rt the rental rate of capital, then the objective 
of the firm is to maximize profits, which equal:
 ,
max{ ( , ) }.
t t
t t t t t tk h
F k h rk w h− −
 
(4.8)
The equilibrium rental rate and wage rate are:
 ( , ),t k t tr F k h=  (4.9)
 ( , ).t h t tw F k h=  (4.10)
For simplicity we assume that the composite good can be used for either addictive 
consumption, ordinary consumption, or investment.12 Since consumption of ordi-
nary, addictive, and investment goods all have the same production technology, 
they have the same pre-tax price, which is normalized to one. Total production 
in the economy must equal total expenditure, this yield the following resource 
constraint:
 1( , ) ( 1 ) ,t t t t t t tF k h c d k k gδ+= + + − − +  (4.11)
Here, gt are exogenous government expenditures.
4.2  Household’s optimal decisions
The household budget constraint sets after tax wage and rental income and gov-
ernment bond redemption (equal to ,bt tR b  where bt are real bonds issued in t–1 
and redeemed in t) equal to after tax expenditures on government bond issues, 
ordinary and addictive consumption goods, and investment goods, it = kt+1–(1–δ)kt, 
where δ is the depreciation rate. Let τc and τd be the tax rates on consumption 
of ordinary and addictive goods, respectively and let τh be the tax rate on labor 
income. The household budget constraint is then:
 , , , 1
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) .bt t t t h t t t c t t d t t t tR b r k w h c d i bτ τ τ ++ + − = + + + + +  
(4.12)
Below we show that introducing a tax on capital would not change the results. 
Also, we will be more specific on the tax smoothing role played by government 
bonds. Formally, each household maximizes (3.1) subject to (4.12). Let λt denote 
12 It is possible (but cumbersome) to extend the analysis to allow the production technology to 
differ by consumption goods.
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the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. The resulting first order condi-
tions are:
 ,
( 1 ) ( , , ),tc t t c t t tu c s lτ λ β+ =  
(4.13)
 ,
( 1 ) ( , , ),th t t t l t t tw u c s lτ λ β− =  
(4.14)
 
1
, 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( 1 ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , ),
t t
d t t s t t t t t s t t t t tu c s l s d d u c s l s d dτ λ β β
+
− + + + +
+ = +
 
(4.15)
 1 , 1,t t tR tλ λ −= ≥  (4.16)
 1
, 1,bt t tR tλ λ −= ≥  (4.17)
 1 .t tR r δ= + −  (4.18)
Equations (4.13)–(4.17), the budget constraint (4.12), initial conditions k0 and d–1, 
and the appropriate transversality conditions characterize the optimal household 
decisions kt, bt, ht, ct, dt, and λt. In equation (4.15), the household increases effec-
tive consumption by increasing dt (first term on the right hand side), but also 
increases tolerance and therefore reduces future effective consumption (second 
term on the right hand side). From equations (4.13) and (4.15) we have:
 
, ,1 1 1 1 1 2 1
, ,
1 ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )
;
1 ( , , )
d t d ts t t t t t s t t t t t
c t c t t t c t
MUu c s l s d d u c s l s d d
u c s l MU
τ β
τ
− + + + +
+ +
= ≡
+
 
(4.19)
where MUi, t represents the marginal utility of good i at time t.
Any difference in tax rates drives a wedge between the marginal utilities of 
the consumption of ordinary and addictive goods. Thus the optimal tax rate of 
addictive goods exceeds the tax rate of ordinary consumption goods (τd, t > τc, t) if 
and only if MUd, t > MUc,t. The goal of this paper is to find conditions under which 
the marginal utility of addictive goods differs from that of ordinary goods.13
Three wedges exist in our model: one between the marginal utility of addic-
tive and ordinary consumption, a second between the wage and the marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and leisure, and a third between the inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution across consumption goods and the rate of 
interest. The government can affect all three margins by setting a time-varying 
13 Note that τc is defined as a tax on ordinary goods only, not all consumption goods. Thus, the 
ordinary consumption tax is not functionally equivalent to a wage tax, as would be the case with 
a single consumption good. Any change in the wage tax would equally raise the leisure cost of 
both types of consumption goods, and so does not affect the wedge.
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consumption tax, a labor tax, and an addictive goods tax. We do not allow a tax 
on effective consumption, since informational asymmetries rule out taxes on 
effective consumption in practice. Further, there is no need in this context to 
introduce a tax on interest, nor on capital.
To see the tax system is complete and an interest tax is redundant, use equa-
tion (4.13) to eliminate λt from the household first order conditions so that equa-
tion (4.16) becomes:
 
, 1 , 1
, ,
1
.
1
c t c t
t
c t c t
u
R
u
τ
τ β
− −
 +
=  +   
(4.20)
Given a tax rate τc, t–1, the planner can create an effective interest tax by varying τc, t, 
while using τd, t to alter the wedge between the marginal utility of addictive and ordi-
nary consumption, and τh, t to alter the wedge between the wage and the marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and leisure. Alternatively, suppose we remove 
the tax on ordinary consumption and add a tax τk on interest so that (4.20) becomes:
 
, 1
,
,
( 1 ) .c tk t t
c t
u
R
u
τ
β
−
− =
 
(4.21)
Now the planner can equivalently use τk, t to vary the wedge between the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution and the interest rate, while again using τd, t and 
τh, t to vary the other wedges. Thus, the optimal allocations derived below can be 
decentralized using either tax system.14
4.3  Government
The government finances an exogenous sequence of expenditures, gt, with bond 
issues and consumption and labor income tax revenues. The government budget 
constraint is:
 , , , 1
.bt h t t t c t t d t t t t tg w h c d b R bτ τ τ += + + + −  
(4.22)
14 Although labor taxes do not affect the wedge between the marginal utilities of ordinary and 
addictive consumption, they play an important role in the analysis in that without that tax, the 
tax system would be incomplete and the government would be forced to have the same wedge for 
consumption/savings as labor/leisure. The government would then have to consider the effect 
of addictive taxes on this combined wedge, considerably complicating the analysis in a way that 
is unlikely to matter in practice (state and local governments can equivalently affect all three 
wedges using property (capital), addictive, and ordinary consumption taxes).
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As is common in the literature (see, e.g., Chamley 1986), the government opti-
mally uses bonds to smooth tax burdens over time. In the absence of bonds, the 
government may favor the tax with better smoothing properties.15 Changes in 
current addictive goods tax rates affects both current and future tax revenue. The 
existence of government bonds enables us to conveniently summarize the effect 
of a change in current addictive tax rates on all periods as the effect on the infinite 
horizon version of the government’s budget constraint.
Let ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,0 0 0 0, , ,c t d t h t tt t t tgpi τ τ τ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞= = = = =    denote an infinite sequence of 
 government policies. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Gruber and Koszegi 
2001), we assume the existence of a commitment technology, so that the govern-
ment commits to all future policies at time zero. The commitment assumption 
is important. The government clearly suffer from a dynamic inconsistency issue 
similar to the one that is present with capital taxation: in principle the government 
could promise low future taxes on addictive goods, and then find it optimal, from 
a revenue raising point of view, to renege on the promise once households become 
more addicted to reign in more revenues.16 This is analogous to the dynamic consist-
ency problem of capital taxation where government is tempted to back down on the 
initial promise of low capital taxation once the stock of capital has been built up.
Tax evasion is sometimes a problem for governments which impose high 
addictive taxes. Households and firms can evade addictive taxes by not reporting 
cash transactions. Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Koreshkova (2006) show 
the Friedman rule is no longer optimal when income tax evasion via fiat money is 
possible, as the inflation tax has the advantage of taxing unreported cash income. 
An interesting extension of our framework would be to consider another asset, 
money, so that households and firms can evade both wage and addictive taxes by 
not reporting cash transactions. The additional incentives to evade taxes implies 
quantitatively larger deviations from the Friedman rule. We leave this interesting 
extension to future research.
5  Equilibrium and Ramsey problem
Equations (4.9), (4.10), (4.12), (4.13) – (4.16), and (4.22) form a system of nonlinear 
equations that characterize the competitive equilibrium. Hence:
15 However, addictive taxes are common at the state and local level, which frequently have con-
stitutional borrowing restrictions. We leave this interesting case to future research.
16 This mechanism would hinge upon the tax anticipation effect: if households anticipate the 
government will renege on a promise of low future addictive taxes, they will reduce current con-
sumption.
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Definition 1 Given initial values k0 and d–1, a competitive equilibrium is a set 
of allocations {ct, dt, ht, kt}, prices {wt, rt, 
b
tR } and a sequence of policies π 
that satisfy the household budget constraint (4.12), firm profit maximization (4.8), 
the  government budget constraint (4.22), and household maximization of (3.1) for 
all t.
We use the primal approach to determine optimal taxation. The primal 
approach uses household and firm first order conditions to eliminate prices and 
policies from the equations that define the competitive equilibrium. The planner 
then chooses allocations which maximize welfare subject to the remaining equa-
tions from the competitive equilibrium. These equations are the resource con-
straint (4.11) and the implementability constraint (IMC):
 
1 1 1 1 1
=0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1
,0
{ ( , , ) [ ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , )
( , , )( )
( , )] ( , , ) } 0.
1
t
c t t t t s t t t t t s t t t
t
b
c
t t t l t t t t
c
IMC u c s l c u c s l s d d u c s l
u c s l R k R b
s d d d u c s l h
β β
τ
∞
− + + +
+
≡ + + ⋅
+
− − =
+
∑
 
(5.1)
The IMC uses household first order conditions (4.13)–(4.15) to substitute out for 
all prices and policies in the budget constraint (4.12), and the recursively elimi-
nates λt using (4.16)–(4.18). Thus, the IMC is the infinite horizon version of the 
household budget constraint reformulated in terms of marginal utilities. Using 
Walras’ Law and the resource constraint, the IMC can also be thought of as the 
infinite horizon version of the government budget constraint. Therefore, the 
Ramsey approach is convenient in that the planner can, through the IMC, deter-
mine the effect of a change in allocation of resources (i.e., ct, dt, ht) on government 
revenues over the infinite horizon.
The first proposition explores this relationship between the competitive equi-
librium and the IMC and resource constraint.
Proposition 1 Let assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold. Assume that τc, 0 is different from 
the value that satisfies the IMC at the first best. Given k0, d–1, and τc, 0, the allocations 
of a competitive equilibrium satisfy (4.11) and (5.1). In addition, given k0, d–1, and 
τc, 0, and allocations which satisfy (4.11) and (5.1), prices and polices exist which, 
together with the allocations, are a competitive equilibrium.
All proofs are in the appendix.
The Ramsey Problem (L) maximizes welfare and determines the optimal tax 
rates:
Brought to you by | Deakin University
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/11/14 2:25 AM
Rational addiction: a revenue raising perspective      91
 
( ( ) ( )(
( ) ( )) ( ) ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) }
1 1, , , 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 1
,0
1
max ( , ,1 ) ( , ,1 ) , ,1 ,
, ,
, , , , ,1
1
, 1 .
t t t t
t
t t t c t t t t s t t t t tc d h k t
b
c
s t t t t t t l t t t t
c
t t t t t t t t
u c s h u c s h c u c s h s d d
u c s l R k R b
u c s l s d d d u c s h h
F k h c d k k g
β µ
β µ
τ
φ δ
∞
−
=
+ + + +
+
 = − + − + − 
++ − − − +
 + − − − + − − 
∑L
 
(5.2)
Here, μ and φt are the Lagrange multipliers on the IMC and resource constraints, 
respectively. The assumption on the value of τc, 0 made in the proposition above 
is a technical one and it ensures that the value of the Lagrange multipliers on the 
IMC is always positive. The first order conditions that characterize optimal taxa-
tion are:
 
, ,
t
t c t
t
IMCMU
c
φ β µ
∂
= + ∂  
(5.3)
 
, ,
t
t d t
t
IMCMU
d
φ β µ
∂
= + ∂  
(5.4)
 
( , ) ( , ,1 ) ,tt h t t l t t t
t
IMCF k h u c s h
h
φ β µ
∂
= − − ∂  
(5.5)
 1( ( , ) 1 ) .t k t t tF k hβφ δ φ −+ − =  (5.6)
Conditions (5.3)–(5.5) equate the marginal social welfare of c, d, and h with the 
marginal resource cost φ. The marginal social value equals the marginal private 
value, plus the value of the marginal tax revenue. Equation (5.6) equates the 
return on capital with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
Combining equations (5.3) and (5.4), we see that since the marginal 
rate  of  transformation is one, the first best equilibrium (μ = 0) sets the 
 marginal  rate of substitution equal to 1. In the second best (μ≠0), equation 
(4.19) implies the tax ratio is greater than 1 if and only if the marginal rate 
of substitution of addictive goods for ordinary goods is greater than 1 (i.e., 
MUd, t > MUc, t), and so:
 
, , iff .d t c t
t t
IMC IMC
d c
τ τ
∂ ∂
> <
∂ ∂  
(5.7)
If the marginal rate of substitution of addictive goods for ordinary goods is 
greater than 1, then moving resources from ordinary to addictive consumption 
raises private utility. Since taxes are always inducing a welfare loss (second best 
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 solution), it must be the case that moving resources from ordinary to addictive 
consumption results in the loss of tax revenue.
The marginal tax revenue of ordinary consumption depends on how a small 
change in ct affects addictive consumption tax revenue in periods t and t–1, and 
ordinary consumption and labor income tax revenue:
 
, , 1, , 2, 1 , ,
1 .c t cc t t t t cs t t t cs t cl t tt
t
IMC MU u c s d u s d u u h
cβ −
∂
= + + + −
∂  
(5.8)
An increase in ct directly increases ordinary consumption tax revenue (first term 
of the right hand side of 5.8), but decreases the marginal utility of consumption 
and thus requires the planner to lower the ordinary consumption tax rate in order 
to maintain equilibrium, which lowers tax revenues (second term). The third and 
fourth term are offsetting effects. Suppose, for example, that ordinary consump-
tion and effective consumption of the addictive goods are complementary (ucs > 0). 
Then an increase in ct raises MUd, t, so the planner must raise τd, t to maintain 
equilibrium, which increases addictive tax revenues. However, an increase in ct 
also lowers MUd, t–1: consuming dt–1 is less attractive because it causes effective 
consumption to fall in t (tolerance), when the marginal utility of effective con-
sumption is relatively high due to the increase in ct. Thus, the planner must also 
lower τd, t–1, reducing t–1 revenues. Thus an increase in ct has offsetting addic-
tive tax revenue effects which work through the ucs term. Given the homogeneity 
assumption, these two dynamic effects can be combined into a single effect, αucs, 
as if a smaller tax on st, rather than dt, existed. Finally, the fifth term implies that, 
if ucl > 0, an increase in ct increases preferences for leisure, and thus causes the 
planner to decrease the labor income tax rate to maintain equilibrium.
A marginal change in taxation of the addictive goods generates revenue 
effects in periods t–1, t, and t+1. To see this, let imt denote the period t portion of 
the implementability constraint:
 
1 1
1 1 1 2 1
( ( , , ) [ ( , , ) ( , )
( , , ) ( , )] ( , , ) )
t
t c t t t t s t t t t t
s t t t t t t l t t t t
im u c s l c u c s l s d d
u c s l s d d d u c s l h
β
β
−
+ + + +
= +
+ −
 (5.9)
Then the marginal tax revenue of addictive goods can be written as:
 
1 1 11 .t t tt
t t t t
im im imIMC
d d d d
β β
β
−
− +
∂ ∂ ∂∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
(5.10)
The first term on the right hand side of (5.10) indicates that if, for example, the 
planner raises the addictive tax rate in period t, then households anticipate 
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higher taxes in period t and respond by changing behavior in t–1, changing tax 
revenue in period t–1. We call this the tax anticipation effect.17
The second term in expression (5.10) are the ordinary, addictive, and labor 
income tax revenue effects in period t. The current period revenue consist of 
static effects as in equation (5.8), but also a dynamic stock effect for dt. For 
example, households are more reluctant to increase dt following a decrease 
in the addictive tax rate, since an increase in dt raises the future stock of dt. 
The third term indicates that if, for example, the planner lowers dt by raising 
the addictive tax rate, then households are less addicted in period t+1 which 
changes ordinary, addictive, and labor tax revenues in period t+1. We denote 
both the current and future revenue effects caused by a change in the addic-
tion stock the addiction stock effect. Comparing (5.8) and (5.10), we see that 
addictive consumption has two additional revenue effects, the tax anticipa-
tion effect and the addiction stock effect, which are not present with ordinary 
consumption.
Using the homogeneity of s and it is first derivatives, equation (5.10) becomes:
 
, , 1, , 1 2, 1 1 , 1,
, 1 2, 1 1 , 1, , 1 2, 1 1
1
.
d t ss t t t ss t t t cs t t tt
t
cs t t t sl t t t sl t t t
IMC MU u s s u s s u s c
d
u s c u s h u s h
α α αβ
β
β β
+ + +
+ + + + + +
∂
= + + +
∂
+ − −
 
(5.11)
The terms multiplied by α combine revenue effects across periods. For example, 
the first term on the right hand side of (5.11) combines a current period revenue 
effect (increasing dt increases addictive tax revenues in period t) with a tax antici-
pation effect (increasing dt causes households to reduce addictive consumption in 
period t–1, reducing addictive tax revenues in period t–1). Since the effects offset, 
the first term, which would have value MUd, t without addiction, has only value 
αMUd, t. For the terms multiplied by α, offsetting revenue effects across periods 
are equivalent to smaller revenue effects in a single period.
The remaining four terms cannot be combined into a single effect. None-
theless, since s1 and s2 are of opposite signs, the remaining revenue effects in t 
and t+1 are in the opposite direction. In addition, the stronger the tolerance, the 
17 Strictly speaking, given no uncertainty, the entire sequence of addictive consumption levels 
over time are endogenously determined by the planner through the tax rates, and the first order 
condition for dt is written with all other values of dt over time held at their optimal levels. There-
fore, the terms in equation (5.10) indicate that a change in the tax rate in t affects incentives 
in t–1 and t+1, forcing the planner to alter the tax rates in t–1 and t+1 to maintain equilibrium 
with the same optimal values of dt–1 and dt+1. The change in tax rates is what affects revenues 
in t–1 and t+1. Rates in other periods are unaffected since the economy remains on the same 
equilibrium path.
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stronger are the aforementioned dynamic effects, since st+1 enters the third, fifth, 
and seventh terms of (5.11).
In summary then, simple static results and intuition might indicate that 
taxing addictive goods is a good revenue raiser because addictive goods tend 
to be more complementary to leisure and inelastic. However, dynamic general 
equilibrium considerations are likely to yield more moderate results. In the next 
section and in the appendix, we impose stronger assumptions on households 
preferences. This will allow us to obtain sharper results and implications for taxa-
tion of addictive goods in our setting.
6  Results for homothetic preferences
As is typical in the literature on optimal commodity taxation, characteristics of 
the utility function play an important role in determining any deviations from 
uniform taxation. In this section we establish theoretical results for the com-
monly used homothetic utility. Appendices 8.4 and 8.5 consider the quadratic 
and additively separable utility functions, and appendix 8.6 studies a utility func-
tion which is not weakly separable in leisure.
We now assume that the utility function takes the form:
 ( , , ) ( ( , ), ),t t t t t tu c s l q v c s l=  (6.1)
where v(.) is homothetic and q(.) is an increasing function. Weak separability in 
leisure implies that the more income inelastic good is also more complementary 
with leisure. Further, homotheticity implies c and s are equally income elastic, 
and thus equally substitutable with leisure. Thus, homotheticity and weak sepa-
rability imply uniform taxation of c and s. To what extent does this result change 
for the more realistic case where d is taxed rather than s? To answer this question, 
we combine equations (5.7), (5.8), and (5.11), assuming (6.1). Let us define the fol-
lowing elasticities:
 
, , ,
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
, , ,
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
cs t t t t cs t t t t sl t t t t
cs t sc t hs t
s t t t c t t t s t t t
u c s l c u c s l s u c s l h
u c s l u c s l u c s l
σ σ σ≡ ≡ ≡
 
(6.2)
and let σhc, t be defined analogously. Then we can prove the following result.
Proposition 2 Let assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold. In addition, let u(.) be of the form 
given in equation (6.1). Then , ,d t c tτ τ><  for t ≥  1 if and only if
 , ,
( 1 )( 1 ) ( )s t sc t s cs hsJα σ σ α∆σ ∆σ ∆σ><− − − − +  (6.3)
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where
, 1 2, 1
, 1 ,
,
, , , , .s t t i i t i t
d t
u s
J i s cs hs
MU
β
∆σ σ σ
+ +
+
−
≡ ≡ − =
Consider as an example the utility function:
 
11 1
1
( ) , .
1 1
t
t
dc su z l s
d
ασ σ
σ σ
+
− −
−
= + + =
− −
 
(6.4)
We then have σs = σc = σ, σcs = σhs = σsc = 0, and s is HD-α. Condition (6.3) then reduces 
to:
 ( 1 )( 1 ) 0.α σ− − >  (6.5)
In contrast, set 1 ,ts d
α+
=  which implies s2 = J = 0, to remove all addiction, then con-
dition (6.3) reduces to:
 ( 1 ) 0.α σ− − >  (6.6)
So for α = 1 we have uniform taxation in the dynamic model but not in the static 
model, and the reverse if α = 0. For α∈(0, 1) the static and dynamic models have 
opposite predictions about which good to tax at a higher rate.
Homotheticity of c and s does not generally result in uniform taxation of 
addictive and ordinary goods. Three effects determine the intuition behind con-
dition (6.3). Checking (5.8) and (5.11), the dynamic tax anticipation and addiction 
stock effects are active for addictive consumption, but not for ordinary consump-
tion. In addition, even ignoring the dynamic effects taxes are not uniform since 
homotheticity of c and s does not necessarily imply homotheticity of c and d.18
Let us try to isolate the contribution each effect has on condition (6.3). To 
simplify the intuition, we focus on the multiplicative addiction function. First, 
assume γ = 0 so that dt is no longer addictive. Since γ = 0 implies both α = 1 and 
s2 = J = 0, condition (6.3) holds with equality, implying uniform taxation is optimal. 
Intuitively, for the multiplicative addiction function with γ = 0, we have st = dt, and 
so utility is homothetic in c and d. Therefore, the previous literature emerges as a 
special case of (6.3) when γ = 0.19
18 We are following the addiction literature here which models utility as a function of effective 
consumption.
19 For both the multiplicative and subtractive cases, γ = 0 implies α = 1 and st = dt. However, if for 
example, 1 ,t t ts d d
α γ γ+ −
−
=  then γ = 0 does not imply st = dt for α≠1, and so condition (6.3) implies non-
uniform taxation since u is homothetic in c and s but not in c and d.
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Second, to study the tax anticipation effect, consider only the first term of 
(5.10) and the fourth term of (5.8) and set all other terms equal to zero. Condition 
(6.3) then becomes:
 , ,
( 1 ) 0,s t sc tγ σ σ ><− −  (6.7)
 , ,
( 1 ) .s t sc tγ σ γσ><−  (6.8)
The left hand side of (6.7) is identical to the left hand side of (6.3). Therefore, for 
the multiplicative case, the left hand side of (6.3) is the tax anticipation effect. The 
strength of the tax anticipation effect is proportional to the degree of tolerance, 
γ. The left hand side of (6.8) is the change in addictive tax revenues in period t–1, 
from a change in dt. Similarly, the right hand side is the change in ordinary tax 
revenues in period t–1, from a change in ct.
By condition (3.3), the left hand side of (6.8) is negative, which favors taxing 
ct at a higher rate. Households anticipate that an increase in taxes in period t 
will reduce addictive consumption in period t. This reduces the marginal utility 
of addictive consumption in t–1 as addictive consumption in t–1 will raise the 
stock of addiction in t, reducing effective consumption when it is already low 
due to the tax. Therefore households desire to reduce addictive consumption in 
t–1, so the planer must decrease the addictive tax rate in t–1 to maintain equilib-
rium, reducing revenues gained from raising the tax in t. Thus, the tax anticipa-
tion effect tends to reduce optimal addictive tax rates (unless σsc is sufficiently 
negative).
The addiction stock effect is the impact on current and future tax revenues 
from a change in st+1 caused by a change in dt:
 , 1 , 1 , 1
0 1 .s t cs t hs tα ασ σ σ+ + +> − + − +  (6.9)
An increase in τd, t, which reduces dt, makes the household less addicted. Future 
addictive consumption is therefore more elastic and therefore more sensitive to 
future taxes. Thus the first two terms of the right hand side of (6.9) imply that the 
addiction stock effect makes addictive taxation less attractive. Future ordinary 
and labor tax revenues also change because the household is less addicted.
It is important to note that addiction stock effect is weighted differently 
than the tax anticipation effect as it occurs in a different period with a differ-
ent marginal utility of effective consumption. In particular, the tax anticipation 
effect has weight us, ts1, t/MUd,t, whereas the addiction stock effect has weight 
–βus,t+1s2, t+1/MUd,t. Multiplying (6.8) and (6.9) by their weights, adding and sim-
plifying gives (6.3).
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In general the addiction stock effect implies addictive goods should be taxed 
at a higher rate when responses to tax changes are becoming more elastic over 
time. To see this, suppose that σhs is falling, so that J·Δσhs is becoming more nega-
tive. Then taxing dt raises labor tax revenues today, but decreases labor tax rev-
enues less in t+1, when σhs is lower. Because the hours response is more elastic in 
period t+1, the planner must raise the tax rate by a relatively small amount in t+1 
to maintain equilibrium, whereas in period t the planner must lower the tax rate 
by a relatively large amount. In this case, taxing addictive goods is more attractive 
than taxing ordinary consumption goods.
As shown in the following propositions, however, some common specifica-
tions for v and s induce constant elasticities, in which case the addiction stock 
effect exactly offsets static revenue effects (the right hand side of 6.1 is zero).
Proposition 3 Let the conditions of Proposition 2 hold, and let 
1 1( ) 1(.) ( ) ,
1
c su z l
ξ ξ σ
σ
− −
−
= +
−
 and z(.) be concave, then τd = τc for all t ≥  1.
Although we have assumed here that v(.) is constant relative risk aversion 
(CRR), this proposition is considerably more realistic than the existing literature 
which assumes a static utility function and/or separable quadratic utility for trac-
tability. If utility is CRR in c and s and separable in l, then we obtain the classic 
result of uniform commodity taxation.
The above result is not a special case of the previous static literature. It is 
novel: consider only the terms that contain dt in the infinite horizon utility 
function:
 
1
1 1( , ( , ),1 ) ( , ( , ),1 )
t t
t t t t t t t tU u c s d d h u c s d d hβ β
+
− −
= + − + − +… …
 (6.10)
Treating (6.10) as a static utility function with goods [ct, ct+1, dt, dt+1, lt, lt+1], then 
the result in the static literature (e.g., Chari and Kehoe 1998, 19–20) is that one 
obtains uniform taxation whenever U is homothetic in ct and dt and weakly sepa-
rable in other goods (U = G(H(ct, dt), ct+1, dt–1, dt+1, lt, lt+1), with H homothetic). Note 
that these conditions do not hold for the CRR utility function in Proposition 3. 
Instead, the uniform taxation result in Proposition 3 arises because the current 
period revenue and dynamic effects exactly offset.20
Elasticities are also constant in the steady state. Let y  denote the steady 
state value of any variable y, then:
20 Uniform taxation does not occur generally even when u and s are both homogeneous to the 
same degree. However, if both u and s are HD-1, the dynamic and static effects also exactly can-
cel, resulting in uniform taxation.
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Proposition 4 Let the conditions of Proposition 2 hold. Then d cτ τ>  if and only if:
 ( 1 )( 1 ) 0.s scα σ σ− − − >  (6.11)
In the steady state with homotheticity in c and s, an increase in addictive tax rev-
enues in t has an equal and opposite decrease in addictive tax revenues in t+1. 
In contrast, whether or not the tax anticipation effect fully offsets the remaining 
current revenue effects depends on the homogeneity of the addiction function. For 
HD-1 addiction functions, including the subtractive model, Proposition 4 indicates 
that the steady state tax rates are uniform. For the multiplicative case, the degree of 
homogeneity is decreasing in the strength of tolerance. Condition (6.11) becomes:
 ( 1 ) 0.s scγ σ σ− − >  (6.12)
Therefore, an increase in tolerance causes a decrease in the steady state addic-
tive tax rate if and only if 1 0.s scσ σ− − <  Therefore, addictive goods are taxed at 
a lower rate in the steady state if and only if higher tolerance reduces the steady 
state addictive tax rate.21
In the appendix we consider other classes of utility functions with non-trivial 
labor supply effects. We also provide a detailed example with linear quadratic utility.
7  Conclusions
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to characterize and analyze the 
conditions under which taxation of addictive goods might differ from taxes on 
labor and ordinary consumption goods in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. 
We derive a rich set of results. In particular, we derive conditions for a variety of 
classes of utility functions for which tax rates for addictive goods exceeds tax 
rates for ordinary goods in an environment where exogenous government spend-
ing cannot be financed with lump sum taxes.
We find that two effects differentiate taxation of addictive goods from ordinary 
goods. The first is the tax anticipation effect tends to moderate the optimal tax: 
households anticipate future increases in addictive tax rates and reduce addictive 
consumption, decreasing addictive tax revenues. Given the empirical literature 
finds evidence for the tax anticipation effect,22 it is important to account for it.
21 Propositions 2 and 4 indicate that the choice of addiction function is not innocuous when de-
signing optimal tax policies. In particular, condition (6.11), implies uniform steady state taxation 
for the subtractive model, but not necessarily for the multiplicative model.
22 See Section 4.2.
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Second, an addiction stock effect exists. Current addictive taxes change 
the future tax base. Households will be less addicted in the future following an 
addictive tax increase. Thus future addictive, ordinary, and labor tax revenues 
are affected by a change in the current addictive tax rate. Whether the addiction 
stock effect increases revenues or not depends on whether or not elasticities are 
rising or falling. In the steady state, or with CRR utility, elasticities are constant 
and thus the addiction stock effect and current period revenue effects cancel. Sur-
prisingly, the tax anticipation effect makes taxing addictive goods in a dynamic 
setting similar to taxing effective consumption, in which the addictive good is 
less complementary with leisure to a degree which depends on the homogene-
ity of the addiction function. Therefore, classic results on uniform taxation re-
emerge in some special cases such as CRR utility.
We consider homogeneous addiction functions, an improvement upon 
the literature which typically assumes only either subtractive or multiplicative 
addiction functions. Higher tolerance strengthens the tax anticipation effect and 
therefore reduces the optimal addictive tax. This result is very surprising as the 
textbook intuition suggests that stronger addiction would make taxing addictive 
goods more attractive.
We also consider features such as complementarity to leisure that, while not 
directly related to the definition of addiction, are nonetheless properties many 
addictive goods display. In general, such effects are weaker in our dynamic 
setting. Examples are constructed where failing to account for the dynamic 
effects results in taxing addictive goods at a higher rate, when the optimal addic-
tive tax is actually less than that of ordinary goods, due to the tax anticipation 
effect.
Our results come with a few caveats. First, one common feature of addic-
tive goods, the presence of externalities, has not been considered in this paper. 
However, it is unclear whether externalities are not better dealt with by regulating 
the exact behavior that causes the externality, such as banning smoking in public 
places, rather than the second best solution of taxing consumption of the addic-
tive good. In addition, if we include an externality, then our results go through 
under slightly different conditions. That is, our results can be interpreted as rela-
tive to the tax ratio which corrects the externality.
Second, the rational addiction framework does not capture all features of 
addiction. The main alternative, modeling addiction as either rational or irra-
tional excess consumption, has intuitive appeal but also some drawbacks. First, 
in that framework the degree of excess consumption must be heterogeneous 
across the population. The optimal tax is sensitive to both the degree of excess 
consumption and the fraction of the population that suffers from excess con-
sumption. Furthermore, time inconsistent preferences require separability in 
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addictive and ordinary goods, no savings, and often ad hoc utility functions for 
tractability purposes. Since we show here that properties of the utility function 
such as homotheticity, tolerance, and homogeneity of the addiction function are 
crucial in establishing optimal taxation results, our modeling choice is in some 
dimensions less restrictive than alternatives, especially if the government has a 
revenue raising motive. Nonetheless, the effect of other features of addiction, 
such as rehab cycles and commitment devices, on optimal revenue raising is an 
interesting subject of future research.
Third, we consider only the optimal tax package, not the optimal addictive 
goods tax taking as given restrictions on tax implementation. Certain features of 
the tax code such as balanced budget rules and positive capital tax rates, if added 
as extra constraints, may change our results. Third, we have no heterogeneity 
in addictive consumption or wealth. However, if we assume that the poor are 
more likely to consume addictive goods, then our results would likely strengthen, 
because consumers of addictive goods would have a higher marginal utility of 
income.
Finally, by choosing to adopt the Ramsey approach, we are subject to the 
typical criticisms made to this framework: it takes the set of possible fiscal 
instruments as given and it requires linear taxes. Our results might change if 
we allowed for heterogeneous households and nonlinear tax rates within a Mir-
rless framework. However, while capital and income taxes are nonlinear in the 
data, addictive taxes are typically linear. In addition, it would be very hard, in 
particular at the state level, to monitor addictive consumption for each house-
hold. Most importantly, the majority of re distributive fiscal policy is carried out 
at the federal level in the US. Excise taxes at the state level are not typically set 
with a redistributive intent, as in a Mirrless framework, but rather to generate 
fiscal revenues and balance the state budgets. We leave the interesting theoreti-
cal issues concerning taxation of addictive goods in the Mirrless framework for 
further research as well.
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Appendix: proofs and additional cases
Proof of Proposition 1
To see that a competitive equilibrium satisfies the IMC and resource constraint, 
we substitute the factor prices (4.9) and (4.10) into the budget constraint (4.12). 
Using constant returns to scale, we then have:
 , , , 1
( , ) ( , ) =( 1 ) ( 1 ) .bt t t t h t h t t t c t t d t t t tR b F k h F k h h c d i bτ τ τ ++ − + + + + +  
(8.1)
Combining the above equation with the government budget constraint (4.22) 
gives the resource constraint (4.11).
To derive the IMC from the budget constraint, we substitute the household 
first order conditions (4.13)–(4.15) into the budget constraint (4.12), eliminating 
the tax rates, so that:
 1 1 ,
= ( ( , , ) ( , , ) ).b tt t t t t t t t t t c t t t t d t t l t t t tR k R b k b u c s l c MU d u c s l hλ λ λ λ β+ ++ − − + +  
(8.2)
Next using the first order conditions (4.16) and (4.17), we have:
 1 1 1 1 ,
( ) ( ) ( ( , , ) ( , , ) ).tt t t t t t t t c t t t t d t t l t t t tR k b R k b u c s l c MU d u c s l hλ λ β+ + + ++ − + = + +  
(8.3)
The above equation characterizes a sequence of budget constraints that can be 
used to recursively eliminate λtRt(kt+bt), yielding:
 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0
,
( ) lim ( ) ( ( , , )
( , , ) ).
b t
t t t t c t t t tt t
d t t l t t t t
R k R b R k b u c s l c
MU d u c s l h
λ λ β
∞
+ + + +→∞
=
+ − + =
+ −
∑
 
(8.4)
The transversality conditions imply the second term on the left hand side equals 
zero. Again using the household first order conditions at period zero gives:
 
,0 0 0 0 0
,
0,0
( )
= ( ( , , ) ( , , ) ),
1
b
c t
c t t t t d t t l t t t t
tc
u R k R b
u c s l c MU d u c s l hβ
τ
∞
=
+
+ −
+
∑
 
(8.5)
which is the IMC.
We next show that, given allocations which satisfy the IMC and resource con-
straint, prices and policies exist which, along with the allocations, are a com-
petitive equilibrium. Let {ct, kt, ht, dt} be a sequence which satisfies the IMC and 
resource constraint. Then rt and wt are defined using equations (4.9) and (4.10). 
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Since τc, 0 is given, we can define λ0 using equation (4.13). Then λt can be defined 
recursively using equation (4.16). Then btR  is defined using equation (4.17). Next, 
we define the government policies:
 
,
( , , )
( 1 ) ,
t
c t t t
c t
t
u c s lβ
τ
λ
+ =
 
(8.6)
 
,
( , , )
( 1 ) ,
( , )
t
l t t t
h t
t h t t
u c s l
F k h
β
τ
λ
− =
 
(8.7)
 
,
,( 1 ) ,
t
d t
d t
t
MUβ
τ
λ
+ =
 
(8.8)
Given the above prices and policies, all equations which define a competitive 
equilibrium are satisfied except the household and government budget con-
straints. We use bt to satisfy the household budget constraint:
 
, , , 1
1 ( ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) .t t t h t t t c t t d t t t tb
t
b r k w h c d i b
R
τ τ τ
+
= − − − + + + + + +
 
(8.9)
We can multiply the above equation by λt and recursively eliminate bt+1 from the 
above equation. After eliminating prices and policies using the household first 
order conditions (4.13)–(4.15), bt is a function of the allocations:
 
1 ,0
, , ,
0 ,0
1
( ( , ) 1 ) ( )
t c i
t k i i c i i d i i l i i t
i i tc
b F k h u c MU d u h k
τ
δ β
τ
∞−
= =
+ 
= + − + − −  ∏ ∑
 
(8.10)
The above equation is the debt allocation which implies the household budget 
constraint is satisfied.
Since the budget constraint is satisfied, we simply substitute the resource con-
straint into the budget constraint to see that the government budget constraint is 
satisfied. Finally, by substituting the prices and policies into the IMC and reversing 
the derivation of the IMC, we see that the transversality conditions are satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we rewrite equations (5.8) and (5.11), using the σ definitions, so that:
 
, , ,( 1 ),
t
c t c sc t hc t
t
IMC u
c
β σ ασ σ
∂
= − + −
∂  
(8.11)
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, 1 2, 1
, , , , , , 1 ,
,
, 1 , , 1
( (
)).
s t tt
d t s t cs t hs t s t s t cs t
t d t
cs t hs t hs t
u sIMC MU
d MU
β
β α ασ σ σ ασ ασ σ
σ σ σ
+ +
+
+ +
∂
= − + − + − −
∂
+ + −
 
(8.12)
Now since v is homothetic, we know that:
 
( , ) ( , )
,
( , ) ( , )
c c
s s
v c s v c s
v c s v c s
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
≡
 
(8.13)
which implies:
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
= ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
cc cs ss cs
c c s s
v c s c v c s s v c s s v c s c
v c s v c s v c s v c s
+ +
 
(8.14)
which, using the definition of u(.) in equation (6.1), implies:
 .sc c cs sσ σ σ σ− = −  (8.15)
It is also immediate from the definition of u(.) that σhc = σhs. These facts and equa-
tions (5.3), (5.4), (8.11), and (8.12) together imply:
 
, , , , ,
, , , ,
1 ( 1 ( 1 ) )
.
1 ( ( ))
d t s t cs t sc t hs t
c t s t cs t hs t s cs hs
MU
u J
µ σ σ α σ σ
µ α ασ σ σ α∆σ ∆σ ∆σ
+ − + − − −
=
+ − + − + − +
 
(8.16)
Hence, τd, t > τc, t if and only if the right hand side is greater than one, or:
 , , ,
1 ( 1 ) ( ),sc t s t s t s cs hsJα σ σ α ασ α∆σ ∆σ ∆σ− − − > − + − +  (8.17)
which simplifies to the desired result.
Proof of Propositions 3–4
For the CRR case, note that σhs = 0, σs = 1–(1–ξ)(1–σ), and σsc = (1–ξ)(1–σ), which 
implies the left hand side of condition (6.3) is zero. The right hand side of (6.3) is 
also zero since σcs and σs are constant.
For the steady state case, σi,t = σi, t+1 for all i∈{s, sc, cs, hs}, so the result follows 
immediately from condition (6.3).
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An analytical example: the quadratic case
In this section, we consider a linear-quadratic utility function. The linear-quadratic 
utility, a common specification in the literature (e.g., Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 
1994, Gruber and Koszegi 2001), offers several advantages. First, we can analytically 
obtain a solution for this case. This allows us to study how the dynamics of addic-
tive consumption change optimal taxation. Second, since this specification has no 
income effects to complicate the dynamics, we can more precisely characterize the 
relationship between tolerance and addictive taxation.
Assume the subtractive specification (3.6) for effective consumption holds 
and that the utility and production function are:
 
2 2
( , , ) , 1, ,
2 2 1
t t
t t t t t t
s lu c s l c s el e ωω ν ν
βγ
= + − + − < >
−  
(8.18)
 
1( , ) .t t t tF k h k h
θ θ−
=
 (8.19)
Proposition 7 requires the above assumptions on e and ν to rule out corner solu-
tions, that is they ensure positive and unique steady state hours and ordinary and 
addictive consumption.
Using equations (5.3) and (5.4), given the utility function (8.18), reveals that 
the marginal utility of dt is constant in the optimal second best allocation. In 
particular:
 
,
( ( 1 )) .
1 2d t
MU ω µ ω ν βγ
µ
+ + −
=
+  
(8.20)
The marginal utility of dt divided by MUc, t = ω equals the tax ratio given by equa-
tion (4.19). Hence the tax ratio is constant over time. Furthermore, inspection 
of equations (4.13), (4.16), (5.3), and (5.6) indicates that τc is constant over time. 
Therefore, τd and τh are also constant over time. Thus the implicit interest tax rate 
is zero for all t.
Equation (8.20) implies MUd, t > MUc, t, and thus τd, t > τc, t for all t. Hence, we 
have shown:
Proposition 5 Let u(.,.,.) and F(.,.) be given by equations (8.18) and (8.19) and let 
effective consumption be given by (3.6). Then τd, t > τc, t for all t ≥  1 and the ratio of tax 
rates ,
,
1
.
1
d t
c t
τ
τ
+
+
 is constant over time.
In the static version of the model without addiction, dt = st has an income elas-
ticity equal to zero whereas the income elasticity of ct is positive. Further, ordinary 
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consumption and leisure are substitutes, whereas 0.s w
w s
∂
=
∂  Thus, it is optimal to 
tax dt at a higher rate because, regardless of kt or dt–1, c is more  substitutable with 
leisure.23
It is also clear from equation (8.20) that the second best optimal dt is the solu-
tion to a linear second order difference equation,
 
2
1 1
1( 1 ) ( ( 1 ) ),
1 2t t t
d d d µβγ βγ γ ν βγ ω
µ+ −
+
− + + − = − −
+  
(8.21)
and that the second best optimal st is the solution to a linear first order difference 
equation. However, before computing the solution to dt, we must verify that a 
solution exists for μ. We thus now proceed to prove that a unique, positive solu-
tion for μ exists if government spending is not so large as to exhaust the maximum 
feasible revenue in the economy, and not so small that given initial tax rates are 
sufficient to pay for all current and future government expenditures.
Proposition 6 Let the conditions for Proposition 5 hold. Let gt be a stationary 
sequence with limiting value .g  Then there exists an interval [ζl, ζh], with 0 < ζl < ζh < ∞ 
such that if 
=0
[ , ] ,t t l htG gβ ζ ζ
∞
≡ ∈∑  then a unique positive solution for μ exists.
Proof: we derive the solution for μ by starting from the first order conditions for 
the Ramsey problem (5.3)–(5.6) which now become:
 
( 1 ),tt
φ
ω µ
β
= +
 
(8.22)
 
1( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 2 )( ),t t tt s s
φ
ν βγ µ µ βγ
β +
= − + − + −
 
(8.23)
 
( 1 )
( 1)( 1 ) ( 1 2 ) ,
t
t
t
tt
k
h
e h
θ
φ θ
µ µ
β
 
−   
= − + + +
 
(8.24)
 
1
11 .tt t
t
k
h
θ
φ θ δ φ
−
−
   + − =      
(8.25)
23 The quadratic case with identical elasticities, 2 2
1 1 ( 1 ),
2 2t t t t t
c c s s v hν ν− + − + −  cannot be solved 
analytically. Nonetheless, we can show using proposition 8 that for this case τd ≤  τc, with equality 
if and only if γ = 0.
Brought to you by | Deakin University
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/11/14 2:25 AM
106      Luca Bossi et al.
Using equation (8.22) to eliminate φt gives:
 1( 1 ) ( ( 1 ) )( ),t ts sω µ ν µ µ βγ ++ = + − −  (8.26)
 
( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1)( 1 ) ( 1 2 ) ,t t
t
k e h
h
θ
ω µ θ µ µ
 
+ − = − + + +    
(8.27)
 
1
1 1.t
t
k
h
θ
β θ δ
−   + − =      
(8.28)
With the subtractive specification equation (8.26) implies:
 1 1( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 2 )( ( )),t t t td d d dω µ ν βγ µ µ γ βγ γ− ++ = − + − + − − −  (8.29)
which eventually simplifies to (8.21). In the proof for Proposition 7, we are going 
to show that (8.21) has general solution given by (8.44). In order for Proposition 6 
to hold, we now just need to prove that a non-zero and finite solution for μ exists. 
We proceed to do that in what follows.
Equation (8.28) implies the capital to labor ratio, denoted by A, is constant:
 
1
1
.A
θθ
ρ δ
− 
≡ +   
(8.30)
Thus, equation (8.27) implies
 
1 ˆ ˆ, 1 ( 1 ) ,
1 2t
h h h e Aθµ ω θ
µ
+
= ≡ − + −
+  
(8.31)
is constant. It then follows that kt = Aht is constant as well and equation (8.44) 
implies st and MUd, t are constant themselves. Since the elasticity of substitution 
of consumption over time is infinite, the planner absorbs all changes in gt by 
varying ct. Combining these results with resource constraint (4.11) yields a solu-
tion for ct:
 
1 1
1
1 ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( 1 )) ,
1 2
t t
t tc h A A d d g
θµ δ γ γ
µ
+ +
−
+
= − − − − −
+  
(8.32)
with
 
( 1 )ˆ .
( 1 )( 1 )
d ν βγ ω
γ βγ
− −
≡
− −  
(8.33)
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Now since h0 enters into the left hand side of the IMC (5.1) and k0 is given, the 
solutions for h0, k0 and therefore c0 generally differ from the solutions for t ≥  1. 
Therefore, we let 1
1 2
x µ
µ
+
≡
+
 and insert the solutions for ct, dt, and ht into the IMC 
(5.1) for t ≥  1, so that:
 
1 10 0 0 0
1
1,0
1
1 1
0 ,0 0 ,0 0 0
ˆ ˆ[ ( ( ) ( 1 ))
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1 )( ( 1 ) )( ( 1 ) ) ( 1 ) ]
.
b
t t t
tc
t
t
d l
R k R b x h A A d d
dx dx d e hx hx
c MU d u h g G
θβ ω δ γ ωγ
τ
βγ ν γ γ γ
ω ω ω
∞
+ +
−
=
+
+ −
+
= − − − −
+
+ − − − − + − − +
+ + − + −
∑
 
(8.34)
Next, recall from Proposition 1 that τc, 0 and τh, 0 are given. It follows from equa-
tions (4.13) and (4.14) that the planner cannot choose h0 in this example, and 
instead takes the solution for h0 from the competitive equilibrium as given. 
Further, the terms inside the summation depend on time only through γt+1 and βt, 
and the equation is quadratic in x. Therefore, after evaluating the summation, we 
can write (8.34) as:
 
2
1 1 2 2 3 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )( 1 ) 0,ch x x x x xζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ≡− + − + − = + − − =  (8.35)
where
 
2
2 2
1
( 1 )ˆ ˆ ,h dγζ
β
−
≡ +
 
(8.36)
 
2 1
1 ˆ( 1 ) ,ddβζ γ γ
β −
 
−
≡ −    
(8.37)
 
,0,0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 ,0 0
,0 ,0
( 1 )( ( 1 ) 1)( 1 )1 .
1 1
b
cc
l
c c
k R b
G k h u hθ θ
ω τ θω τ δβ
ζ ω
β τ τ
−
 + −+ − − −
−
≡ − − +  + +   
(8.38)
A solution such that μ > 0 is a solution in the range 
1 1.
2
x< <  Now ch(x) attains a 
maximum at x* = (ζ1–ζ2)/(2ζ1) < 1/2 and ch(0) > ch(1). Hence it is immediate that ζ3 < 0 
is a necessary condition for x < 1.
From equation (8.38), ζ3 > 0 if and only if:
 
,0 0 0 0 ,0 ,0 01
0 0
,0 ,0
( ( 1 ) 1)( 1 ) ( 1 )
.
( 1 ) ( 1 )
b
c c l
l
c c
k R b u h
G k hθ θ
ω τ δ ω τ θ
ζ
ω τ ω τ ω
−
+ − − − + −
> ≡ + −
+ +
 
(8.39)
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This is the lower bound for government spending, G.
Condition (8.39) implies that ζ3 > 0 which in turn implies both roots have 
modulus less than 1. We are left to show that the roots are real and that one root 
is greater than one half. Since x* < 1/2, the smaller root has modulus less than one 
half. The larger root is real and greater than one half if and only if:
 
1 1 2
2 3
1 0,
2 4 2
ch ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ  −=− + + − >    
(8.40)
 
1 2
3
2 .
4
ζ ζ
ζ
−
<
 
(8.41)
Using equation (8.38), condition (8.41) holds if and only if:
 
1 22 .
1 4h l
G ζ ζβζ ζ
β ω
 +
< ≡ +  
−    
(8.42)
Defining ζl and ζh using equations (8.39) and (8.42) completes the proof. □
Given a unique solution for μ, dt is the solution to the second order difference 
equation (8.20) and we can now explicitly characterize that solution.
Proposition 7 Let the conditions for Proposition 5 hold. Then the explicit solution 
for dt is:
 
1 1
1
( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) .
( 1 )( 1 ) 1 2
t t
td d
ν βγ ω µ
γ γ
γ βγ µ
+ +
−
 
− − +
= − + 
− − +   
(8.43)
Proof: We first solve the second order difference equation (8.21):
 
2
1 1
1 1 1 ( 1 ) .
1 2t t t
d d dβγ µ ν βγ ω
βγ β µ βγ+ −
   + + − −
− + =−   +     
(8.44)
It is straightforward to show the general solution of the above difference 
 equation is:
 0 1
( ) ,t tt pd D A Aγ βγ
−
= + +
 (8.45)
 
1 ( 1 ) .
1 2 ( 1 )( 1 )p
D µ ν βγ ω
µ βγ γ
 + − −
≡  + − −   
(8.46)
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Following convention, we rule out the explosive, bubble solutions which requires 
A1 = 0. Letting t = –1 implies A0 = γ(d–1+Dp). Substituting for A0 and simplifying gives 
the desired solution.
Having a closed form solution for dt, given by equation (8.43), allows us to 
derive some interesting properties of the second best solution, both over time and 
when compared to the first best solution (μ = 0). First, optimal consumption of 
dt increases over time, assuming d–1 is less than the steady state. The planner 
decreases dt relative to the first best solution through the tax. However, since 
0 < μ < ∞, equation (8.43) implies dt in the second best optimum is at least half of 
the first best level in the steady state. The planner also decreases the growth rate 
of dt since:
 
1 1
1 1
ˆ( 1 )( ) ( 1 ) 1ˆ, , ,ˆ ( 1 )( 1 ) 1 2( 1 )
t
t t
t t t
t
d d dx dgr d x
d dx d
γ γ ν βγ ω µ
γ βγ µγ γ
− −
−
−
− − −
− − +
= = ≡ ≡
− − +
− +  
(8.47)
which is decreasing in μ because:
 
1
2 2
1
( 1 ) 0.
( 1 2 )
t
t
t
gr d
d
γ γ
µ µ
−
−
∂ −
=− <
∂ +
 
(8.48)
Another important advantage of this exercise with linear quadratic prefer-
ences is that, since we fully characterize the solution, we can explore how the 
strength of tolerance affects second best addictive consumption. To this end, 
since μ(γ) is unique, we can use the implicit function theorem to derive com-
parative statics using equation (8.20). Our results for other utility functions 
suggest strong tolerance should moderate the optimal tax ratio, as gains in 
current tax revenue from taxation of addictive goods are offset by losses in 
future tax revenues. It turns out that, if d–1 is sufficiently large, it is indeed 
true that the optimal tax ratio is inversely related to the degree of tolerance. In 
particular, we have:
 
1
1
1> <0.
( 1 )( 1 )
d
cd
τ
τβω
βγ β γ−
+∂
+
⇒
− − ∂  
(8.49)
Condition (8.49) derived explicitly below, is a sufficient condition calculated 
assuming μ = ∞. In practice, for μ small, the optimal tax ratio is decreasing in the 
degree of tolerance under much less restrictive conditions.
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To derive equation (8.49), we rewrite equation (8.20) using the definition of 
x, which implies:
 
, ,
,
1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ).
1
d t d t
c t
MU
x x
τ ν βγ
τ ω ω
+
−
= = + −
+
 
(8.50)
Hence:
 
,
,
1 ( 1 )= 1 ( 1 ) <0 iff ,
1
d t
c t
x x
τ ν βγ νβ
γ τ γ ω ω
 +  ∂ ∂ −
⋅ − − −     ∂ + ∂   
(8.51)
 
( 1 ) .
( 1 )
x x
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γ ν βγ
∂ −
>
∂ − −  
(8.52)
Next, using the implicit function theorem on equation (8.35), we see that:
 
1 2
1 1 2
( )( 1 )
.
2
x xx
x
γ γ
ζ ζ
γ ζ ζ ζ
+ −∂
=
∂ − +  
(8.53)
Since 1 ,1 ,
2
x  ∈    the denominator of equation (8.53) is positive. Thus, sub-
stituting equation (8.53) into condition (8.52) and cross multiplying results in:
 1 1 2, 2 1
[ ( ( 1 ) ) 2 ] ( ( 1 ) ) .x
γ γ
ζ ν βγ ω βνζ ζ ν βγ ω βνζ βνζ− − + + − − + >
 (8.54)
The coefficient on x in equation (8.54) is positive. Thus, it is sufficient to show:
 
1 1 2, 2 1
1[ ( ( 1 ) ) 2 ] ( ( 1 ) ) ,
2γ γ
ζ ν βγ ω βνζ ζ ν βγ ω βνζ βνζ− − + + − − + >
 
(8.55)
 
1 2, 2
1 ( ( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) 0.
2 γ γ
ζ ν βγ ω ζ ν βγ ω βνζ− − + − − + >
 
(8.56)
Finally substituting in the definitions of ζ using equations (8.36) and (8.37) and 
the derivatives of ζ:
 
2
1, 2, 13 2
2 ( ( 1 ) ) 1 ( 1 ), ,
( 1 ) ( 1 )
d
γ γ
ω ν βγ ω β ν βγ ω
ζ ζ
ββγ βγ −
 
− − − − −
=− =  
− −   
(8.57)
and simplifying yields the desired result.
Table 1 gives parameter values for a numerical example. Table 1 indicates 
that the optimal tax ratio is decreasing in the degree of tolerance, even though 
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condition (8.49) is violated, since the parameter G, set to 30% of GDP for all t, 
generates at most a value of only μ = 4.74. The planner relies increasingly on labor 
taxes and less on addictive taxes as the degree of tolerance increases. For γ = 0.55, 
taxation is nearly uniform. Figure 1 shows the time path of the first and second 
best levels of d for various values of γ. Increasing the level of tolerance severely 
reduces addictive consumption since the future costs of current consumption are 
higher. As expected, the difference between first and second best addictive con-
sumption is widest at the steady state.
Additively separable utility
In this section we consider the case in which utility is additively separable. Fol-
lowing a similar procedure as with Proposition 2, we have:
Proposition 8 Let assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold. In addition, let u(.) be additively 
separable in c, s, and l. Then τd, t > τc, t for all t ≥  1 if and only if:
 , ,
1 ( ).s t c t sJασ α σ α∆σ+ − − >  (8.58)
Proof: If utility is separable, equations (8.11) and (8.12) become:
 
, ( 1 ),
t
c t c
t
IMC u
c
β σ
∂
= −
∂  
(8.59)
 
, ,( ( )).
t
d t s t s
t
IMC MU J
d
β α ασ α∆σ
∂
= − +
∂  
(8.60)
Equations (5.3), (5.4), (8.59), and (8.60) together imply:
 
, ,
, ,
1 ( 1 )
.
1 ( ( 1 ) ( ))
d t c t
c t s t s
MU
u J
µ σ
µ α σ α∆σ
+ −
=
+ − +
 
(8.61)
Hence, d is taxed at a higher rate if and only if the right hand side is greater than 
one, or:
 , ,
1 ( 1 ) ( ),c t s t sJσ α σ α∆σ− > − +  (8.62)
which simplifies to the desired result.
For the intuition of (8.58), first assume s2 = 0, which removes all dynamic 
effects. Condition (8.58) becomes:
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1, 11,
, ,
1,
0t t t ts t c t
t t
s d s d
s s
σ σ− − >
 
(8.63)
Specializing further to the multiplicative or subtractive case (s11, t = 0 and s1, tdt = st), 
gives:
 , ,
0s t c tσ σ− >  (8.64)
This condition is satisfied if and only if st = dt is more complementary with leisure 
(or income inelastic) than ct.24
The difference between the left hand side of conditions (8.64) and (8.58) is 
the tax anticipation effect for the multiplicative case:
 ,
( 1 )( 1 ) 0.s tα σ− − >  (8.65)
Equation (3.3) implies the tax anticipation effect reduces the optimal addictive 
tax if and only if dt is addictive.
As in Proposition 2, the dynamic effects in t–1 and t reduce to a single current 
period term which depends only on the elasticities and homogeneity, and should 
therefore be straightforward to check in empirical applications.
The addiction stock effect equals 1–α+ασs,t+1, which offsets current period 
revenue effects.
For the CRR case, we have:
Proposition 9 Let the conditions of Proposition 8 hold, and let u(.) = v1(c)+v2(s)+v3(l), 
with v1 and v2(.) CRR. Then τd, t > τc, t for all t ≥  1 if and only if:
 1 .s cασ α σ+ − >  (8.66)
Proof: For CRR preferences, σi, t = σi, t+1 for all i∈{s, c}, so the result follows immedi-
ately from condition (8.58). □
Condition (8.66) combines tax anticipation effect with any difference in 
income elasticities between dt and ct. Condition (8.66) requires that dt and leisure 
to be sufficiently strong complements relative to c in the model without dynamic 
effects to overcome the dynamic tax anticipation effect.
The homogeneity of the addiction function affects the strength of the 
tax anticipation effect. For α = 1, as in the subtractive model, the dynamic tax 
24 If s11, t < 0 or s1d≠s, then dt and st have different income elasticities in the model without dy-
namic effects, and thus condition (8.63) results.
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anticipation effect exactly offsets the difference in income elasticities between 
d and s in the model without dynamic effects. In this case, Proposition 9 says 
τd, t > τc, t if and only if st is more complementary with leisure in a static model where 
s could be taxed. However, in the multiplicative model, higher tolerance implies a 
lower α and thus makes addictive goods less complementary with leisure, lower-
ing the optimal tax rate, for σs, t > 1.
Thus, under the conditions outlined above, neglecting the dynamic tax antic-
ipation effect results in overly high tax rates for addictive goods, relative to the 
optimum, especially for addictive goods that exhibit strong tolerance.
Non-weakly separable utility
For the homothetic and separable cases studied above, weak separability implies 
that the static income elasticity and the substitutability with leisure are identical. 
Here we consider a utility function for which the substitutability with leisure does 
not necessary equal the income elasticity.
To see this in a concise way, let us consider the following class of utility 
functions:
 ( , , ) ( ) ( , ).t t t t t tu s d l q c v s l= +  (8.67)
For this specification, we find:
Proposition 10 Let assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold. In addition, let u(.) be of the form 
given by (8.67). Then τd, t > τc, t for all t ≥  1 if and only if:
 , , ,
1 ( ).s t hs t c t s hsJα ασ σ σ α∆σ ∆σ− + + − > +  (8.68)
Proof: If utility is given by equation (8.67), equations (8.11) and (8.12) become:
 
, ,( 1 ),
t
c t c t
t
IMC u
c
β σ
∂
= −
∂  
(8.69)
 
, , ,( ( )).
t
d t s t hs t s hs
t
IMC MU J
d
β α ασ σ α∆σ ∆σ
∂
= − − + +
∂  
(8.70)
Equations (5.3), (5.4), (8.69), and (8.70) together imply:
 
, ,
, , ,
1 ( 1 )
.
1 ( ( 1 ) ( ))
d t c t
c t s t hs t s hs
MU
u J
µ σ
µ α σ σ α∆σ ∆σ
+ −
=
+ − − + +
 
(8.71)
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Hence, d is taxed at a higher rate if and only if the right hand side is greater than 
one, or:
 , , ,
1 ( 1 ) ( ),c t s t hs t s hsJσ α σ σ α∆σ ∆σ− > − − + +  (8.72)
which simplifies to the desired result. □
The intuition for (8.68) is identical to that of Propositions 2 and 8, with the 
exception of the additional current period effect on labor tax revenues, reflecting 
the lack of weak separability.
For constant elasticities, we have:
Proposition 11 Let the conditions of Proposition 10 hold, and let 
( 1 ) 1( ( 1 ) ) 1(.) ,
1
s lv
ξ ξ σ
σ
− − −
− −
=
−
 with 
11
1 2
σ
ξ
−
− <
−
 and 1
2
ξ<  to ensure concavity. Then 
τd, t > τc, t for all t ≥  1 if and only if:
 1 ( 1 )( 1 ( 1 )) .cσ ξ α σ+ − − + >  (8.73)
Proof: note that σs = 1–ξ(1–σ), and σhs = (1–ξ)(1–σ). Since both terms are constant, 
we have J(αΔσs+Δσhs) = 0. Substituting in these conditions into equation (8.68) 
gives (8.73). □
Note that the concavity restrictions imply the left hand side of (8.73) is less 
than one. Since σ > 1 and 1
2
ξ<  (both conditions are necessary for concavity) and 
α ≤  1, the second term on the left hand side is negative and so σc, t ≥  1 is sufficient 
for the condition to be violated, and thus τd, t ≤  τc, t.
Proposition 12 Let the conditions of Proposition 10 hold. Then d cτ τ>  if and only if:
 ( 1) 1.s hs cα σ σ σ− + > −  (8.74)
Proof: σi,t = σi,t+1 for all i∈{s, hs} in the steady state, so the result follows immedi-
ately from condition (8.68). □
It is possible to construct examples for which dt is more complementary with 
leisure and yet the tax anticipation effect implies a lower tax rate for addictive 
goods. Suppose subtractive model, then in the static model with utility as in 
Brought to you by | Deakin University
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/11/14 2:25 AM
Rational addiction: a revenue raising perspective      115
Proposition 11, s is more complementary with leisure than c. Yet if (8.73) is vio-
lated it is optimal to tax dt at a lower rate.
Finally, given the subtractive model, the static effects for condition (8.73) are:
 
1 ( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) ,
1 c
ξ σ
ξ σ σ
γ
− −
+ − − >
−  
(8.75)
and condition (8.74) becomes:
 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) .cξ σ ξ σ σ− − + − − >  (8.76)
So for σc satisfying (8.75), but not (8.76), d cτ τ>  in the model without dynamic 
effects but d cτ τ<  when the tax anticipation effect is accounted for. Note the range 
of values satisfying (8.75) but not (8.76) is increasing in γ. Strong tolerance tends 
to decrease the optimal addictive tax, by strengthening the tax anticipation effect.
Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1 Parameter values and results for variables which are constant over time.
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Results for constant variables
Variable  γ = 0  γ = 0.45  γ = 0.5  γ = 0.55
β   0.9  kt   2.19  1.66  1.58  1.54
ν   2  ht   0.76  0.57  0.55  0.53
θ   0.4  yt   1.16  0.88  0.83  0.81
gt   0.3  it   0.22  0.17  0.16  0.15
δ   0.1  μ   0.39  2.23  3.48  4.74
e   0.95  x   0.78  0.59  0.56  0.55
d–1   0.02  τc   0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07
τc, 0   0.07  τd   0.30  0.15  0.12  0.075
b0   0  τh   0.18  0.39  0.42  0.44
ω   1         
The parameters h0 and k0 are set equal to ht using equation (8.31) and kt = Aht, respectively. The 
parameter gt is set equal to 30% of GDP for all t.
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